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Abstract 
Uncertainty pervades most aspects of life. From selecting a new technology to choosing a 
career, decision makers often ignore the outcomes of their decisions. In the last decade a new 
paradigm has emerged in behavioral decision research in which decisions are “experienced” 
rather than “described”, as in standard decision theory. The dominant finding from studies 
using the experience-based paradigm is that decisions from experience exhibit "black swan 
effect", i.e. the tendency to neglect rare events. Under prospect theory, this results in an 
experience-description gap. We show that several tentative conclusions can be drawn from 
our interdisciplinary examination of the putative experience-description gap in decision under 
uncertainty. Several insights are discussed. First, while the major source of under-weighting 
of rare events may be sampling error, it is argued that a robust experience-description gap 
remains when these factors are not at play. Second, the residual experience-description gap is 
not only about experience per se, but also about the way in which information concerning the 
probability distribution over possible outcomes is learned.  
Additional econometric and empirical work might be required to fully flech out these 
tentative conclusions. However, there was a consensus that an initially polemical literature 
turns out to be constructive in drawing researcher towards greater rapprochements. 
 
Key words: Black swans, risk, ambiguity, four-fold pattern, (non)-expected utility, 
probabilistic choices, experience-based decision making, description-based decision making.  
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1 Introduction 
The standard paradigm for studying decision under uncertainty entails presenting 
participants with choices between prospects that are described as event-contingent outcomes 
(e.g. lose $50 with probability .5, and nothing otherwise; gain $100 if the home team wins and 
nothing otherwise). The decision maker is either provided with objective probabilities from 
the outset (risk), or has to assign subjective likelihoods to events (ambiguity). Most of the 
accumulated empirical findings observed a robust tendency for people to overweight small 
probabilities, and to underweight moderate to high probabilities under risk (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). Similarly, under ambiguity  people tend to overweight events that they 
perceive to be unlikely, and underweight events that they perceive to be likely (Tversky and 
Fox, 1995; Fox and Tversky, 1998; Wakker 2010).  
In the last decade a new paradigm has emerged in behavioral decision research in 
which decision are “experienced” rather than “described”. Both probabilities and outcomes 
must be learned through sampling, i.e. repeated draws with replacement from a probability 
distribution unknown to the decision maker (Hertwig et al. 2004). The dominant finding from 
studies using this paradigm is that decisions from experience are characterized by diminished 
impact of rare events (see Barron and Erev 2003; Hertwig et al. 2004). Taleb (2007) refers to 
a related under-sensitivity to rare events as the Black Swan effect. The contrast between 
decisions from experience and decisions under risk is usually referred to as the “experience-
description gap.” 
In this paper we take a critical look at the experience-description gap. First, we take 
stock of prior contributions to this literature. Second, we propose to investigate ways to enrich 
the study of the experience-description gap using advanced econometric tools that explicitly 
account for errors and heterogeneity. Third, we attempt to reconcile the literature on decisions 
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from experience with recent empirical literature on (description based) decision under 
ambiguity (Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace, 2013).  
2 Risk and Ambiguity in Prospect Theory  
In standard decision making under uncertainty paradigm, an alternative, or a prospect, 
is described by a list of event-contingent outcomes. To illustrate, let xEy denote the prospect 
that pays $x if event E obtains, and $y otherwise. For instance, setting x = 10, y = 1, and R = 
“rain tomorrow,” the prospect 10R1 denotes a prospect yielding $10 if there is rain tomorrow 
and $1 otherwise. The evaluation of such alternatives requires an assessment not only of the 
desirability of outcomes (utilities), but also of the likelihoods of the corresponding events 
(probabilities or their generalizations). Under risk, standard decision theory recommends 
evaluating an alternative using expected utility (EU), i.e. the probability-weighted average 
utility of the outcomes. Thus, the EU of 10R1 is P(R)u(10) + (1−P(R))u(1) (P: probability; u: 
utility). Risk aversion, the preference of a sure outcome over a risky prospect with equal or 
higher expected value, is commonly assumed to hold. For risk, with p = P(E), we often write 
xpy instead of xEy.  EU explains risk aversion using a concave utility function over states of 
wealth—for example if gaining $200 adds less than twice the utility of gaining $100, then a 
decision maker should prefer $100 for sure to a prospect that offers a 50-50 chance of $200 or 
nothing. 
Several empirical results challenge the descriptive validity of EU.  Allais’ (1953) 
famous example for risk challenged the descriptive validity of EU. It suggests that people do 
not weight the utilities by their probabilities. More generally, the assumption of risk aversion 
is violated by the commonly observed fourfold pattern of risk preferences: risk aversion for 
moderate to high probability gains and low probability losses, coupled with risk seeking for 
low probability gains and moderate to high probability losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
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Rabin (2000) showed that moderate risk aversion for small-stakes mixed (gain-loss) gambles 
at all levels of wealth (assuming a strictly increasing and concave utility function) implies an 
implausible level of risk aversion for large-stakes gambles.  
These empirical and theoretical violations of EU are accommodated by prospect theory 
(PT), the leading descriptive model of decision under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Under PT, outcomes are evaluated with respect to a 
reference point, normalized to 0. Utility u is strictly increasing and u(0)=0. It exhibits 
diminishing sensitivity: marginal utility diminishes with the distance from the reference point, 
leading to concavity for gains but convexity for losses. Diminishing sensitivity contributes to 
risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. The latter goes against conventional 
wisdom, but has been confirmed empirically. Furthermore, utility u is characterized by loss 
aversion in which the function is steeper for losses than gain—typically this is modeled by 
multiplying utility for losses by a coefficient λ > 1 (Figure 1). Loss aversion accommodates 
risk-aversion for modest stakes gambles that scales up reasonably proportionally.  
Probabilities are transformed by a weighting function w+ for gains and by w- for losses, both 
normalized so that w(0)=0 and w(1)=1, and strictly increasing (Figure 2). Hence; xpy is 
evaluated by: w+(p)u(x) + [1−w+(p)]u(y) if x ≥ y ≥ 0; w-(p)λu(x) + [1−w-(p)]λu(y) if x ≤ y ≤ 0; 
w
+(p)u(x) + w-(1-p)λu(y) if x > 0 > y. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Prospect theory utility function 
u(.) 
Gains Losses 0 
6 
Figure 2 illustrates an S-shaped probability weighting function. It shows that the lower 
probability interval [0,q] has more impact than the middle interval [p, p+q], which is bounded 
away from the lower and upper endpoints. Similarly, the upper interval [1-q, 1] has more 
impact than the middle interval [p, p+q]. The underweighting of moderate to large 
probabilities reinforces the tendency implied by the S-shaped utility function toward risk 
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, but reverses this pattern for very low probabilities, 
which are overweighted. 
 
Figure 2: Probability weighting function 
Numerous studies surveyed by Wakker (2010) have confirmed the above qualitative 
empirical properties using choices among simple risky prospects.  
3 The Description-Experience Gap  
Research on “decisions from experience” (DFE) employ paradigms in which individuals 
learn outcomes and their likelihoods through the sequential sampling of outcomes. Three 
experimental paradigms (see Hertwig and Erev 2009) and variants thereof have been used. All 
involve a choice between two or more payoff distributions. In the most popular sampling 
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paradigm, people first sample from the distributions as long as they wish without costs. Once 
search is terminated, they decide from which distribution to make a single incentivized draw. 
In the full-feedback paradigm, each draw adds to a person’s income, and she receives draw-
by-draw feedback about the actual and forgone payoffs. Finally, the partial-feedback 
paradigm restricts feedback to the actual payoffs. Comparisons of DFE with decisions from 
descriptions (DFD; made on described distributions as in the studies of decision-making 
under risk; Section 2) reveal a large experience-description gap (Hertwig and Erev 2009). 
Figure 3 illustrates this gap using six representative decision problems. In DFE, people 
behave as if the rare events have less impact than they deserve according to their objective 
probabilities, whereas in DFD people behave as if the rare events have more impact than they 
deserve (consistent with PT).  
 
Figure 3: The experience–description gap 
Choice patterns in all three experience-based paradigms are surprisingly similar with 
the tendency to “underweight” rare events particularly robust in the full-feedback paradigm. It 
should be noted that when all possible payoffs are identified explicitly, this eliminates 
underweighting of rare events in the sampling paradigm (see Abdellaoui et al. 2011b, Hadar 
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and Fox 2009) though this does not appear to occur in the full-feedback paradigm (see 
Yechiam et al. 2005).  
What causes the description–experience gap? 
Five broad contributors to the gap have been advance in prior research—the first two 
relate to DFE and choices consistent with underweighting and neglect of rare events; the next 
two relate to DFD, and choices consistent with overweighting of rare events; the final relates 
to both. 
Sampling error and sheer unawareness of the rare events’ existence 
A world in which all risks and hazards are fully described is unattainable. Therefore, 
we often cannot help but be unaware of rare events. A close cousin of unawareness is 
obliviousness due to reliance on the wrong model such as estimating financial risks with tools 
that assume a normal distribution in non-Gaussian environments (Taleb 2007). Unawareness 
of rare events can also occur in the sampling paradigm in which people tend to sample little 
(see Hertwig et al. 2004) and likely contributed to the experience-description gap documented 
using the original sampling paradigm (cf. Hadar and Fox, 2009).  In fact, when one accounts 
for sampling error in the seminal study of Hertwig et al. (2004) so that decisions are analyzed 
with respect to sampled probability distributions over outcomes (i.e. what participants actually 
experienced) rather than the “objective” probability distributions from which outcomes were 
sampled (which was opaque to participants), choices accord well with prospect theory (Fox 
and Hadar 2006). 
Selective reliance on past experiences  
Reliance on past experiences contributes to the attenuated impact of rare events in DFE. 
In many settings people behave as if they rely on small samples drawn from their past 
experiences (e.g. those more recently experienced; see Hertwig et al., 2004), and tend to 
choose as if they underweight rare events that they have, in fact, experienced. The impact of 
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this tendency also emerged in two choice prediction competitions focusing on the full- and the 
partial-feedback paradigms (Erev et al. 2010a, 2010b): the winning models in both 
competitions implied reliance on small set of past experiences.  
Tallying 
A factor amplifying the gap concerns the way people search in the sampling paradigm. 
Hills and Hertwig (2010) found that those who frequently switch between the payoff 
distributions are likely to choose options that win most of the time in round-wise comparisons. 
Such comparisons ignore the magnitude of the win (defeat), thus giving little weight to rare 
events. Frequent switchers thus strongly contribute to the description-experience gap, whereas 
infrequent switchers are more likely to take account of impactful rare events by forming a 
running mean.  
The mere-presentation effect: Analogical vs. propositional representations  
 Erev, Glozman and Hertwig (2008) have argued that a mere-presentation effect may 
contribute to overweighting in DFD but not DFE. Specifically, DFD involve propositional 
representations – e.g., 32 with probability 0.1; 0 otherwise – thus putting more equal 
emphasis on outcomes than their actual probabilities warrant. If attention translates into 
decision weights, rare and common events’ weights will regress toward the mean. DFE, in 
contrast, invoke an analogical representation: for instance, draws from the aforementioned 
option could lead to this sequence: {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0}. More attention is allocated to 
the processing of the frequent than the rare events.  
Unpacking and Repacking 
When participants sample an entire distribution of outcomes without replacement so 
that there is no sampling error, and therefore no unawareness, there appears to remain a 
reduced but significant description-experience gap in their choices, and selective reliance on 
past experiences may not play a role, as judgments are quite accurate (Ungemach et al. 2009). 
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Fox et al. (2013) validated the robustness of this finding and argued that it was due to the fact 
that decisions from experience using the sampling paradigm “unpack” occurrence of 
outcomes (and therefore attention afforded them) in proportion to their objective probabilities 
(Similar to Erev et al, 2008 cited above). Fox et al. (2013) show that decisions from 
description can be made to resemble decisions from experience if described outcomes are 
explicitly unpacked. For example, describing the outcome of a game of chance in a “packed” 
manner (e.g., “get $150 if a 12-sided die lands 1-2; get $0 otherwise”) leads to PT-like 
preferences. In contrast, “unpacking” the same description using a table of outcomes by die 
roll (e.g., “$150 if the die rolls 1; $150 if the die rolls 2; $0 if the die rolls 3; $0 if the die rolls 
4”; etc.) leads to the opposite pattern of risk preferences, much like decisions from experience. 
Moreover, Fox et al. (2013) show that prompting decisions makers to mentally “repack” 
events that are sampled from experience (by postponing identification of outcomes associated 
with sampled events until after sampling is completed) leads to choices that accord with 
prospect theory. This result accords with the aforementioned observation of Hills and Hertwig 
(2010) that participants who sample each distribution separately tend toward more prospect-
theory like behavior—one presumes that such sampling facilitates a spontaneous “repacking” 
of probabilities (i.e. consideration of overall impressions of probability of each outcome). 
This work is important because it suggests that the putative experience-description gap is not 
about experience per se but rather about the way in which information is presented.  
4 Decision under described ambiguity 
It seems a little odd to some of us that evidence for the experience-description gap has 
relied almost exclusively on comparisons between DFE paradigms involving sampled 
experience to DFD under risk. Because outcome probabilities are generally ambiguous to 
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decision makers in the DFE paradigms, a more apt comparison might be between DFE and 
DFD under ambiguity. 
The presence of ambiguity introduces two complications to decision weighting under 
prospect theory.  First, decision makers must judge the likelihood of events for themselves.  
Several studies suggest that to a first approximation, choices accord with a two-stage model 
(Tversky and Fox, 1995; Fox and Tversky, 1998; Fox and See, 2003) in which the probability 
weighting function from prospect theory is applied judged probabilities of events, consistent 
with support theory (Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997).  
Generally people tend to overestimate the likelihood of rare events and underestimate the 
likelihood of very common events, which would tends to amplify the characteristic pattern of 
over- and underweighting- in prospect theory.  That said, with the standard sampling 
paradigm in which a small number of outcomes is sampled in a very compact period of time, 
judged probabilities are generally quite accurate (e.g., Fox and Hadar, 2006), perhaps due 
people’s natural facility in counting (e.g. Hasher and Zachs, 1984). 
Second, the shape of the weighting function can vary by domain or source of 
uncertainty, which is defined as a group of events that – being generated by the same 
mechanism of uncertainty – have similar characteristics (see Tversky and Fox 1995, Wakker 
and Tversky, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2011a).  There is accumulating experimental evidence 
that the probability weighting function is systematically affected by specific characteristics of 
the decision situation, whereas the curvature of the utility function is not (e.g., Fehr-Duda and 
Epper 2012). For example, departures from linear weighting are more pronounced in affect-
laden situations than in comparatively pallid ones (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), and high-
stake prospects are evaluated much less optimistically (i.e. lower elevation) than low-stake 
prospects are (Fehr-Duda et al. 2010).  More to the point, people typically exhibit aversion to 
betting on ambiguous events (Ellsberg, 1961), particularly when they feel relatively ignorant 
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or incompetent assessing those events (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Fox 
and Weber, 2002) though ambiguity seeking is occasionally observed, especially for losses 
(Camerer and Weber, 1991). 
If ambiguous probabilities are weighted comparatively more pessimistically than 
chance (risky) probabilities, it stands to reason that sampled outcomes will also be evaluated 
more pessimistically (especially when directly contrasted with described risk; cf. Fox and 
Tversky, 1995). In fact, Abdellaoui et al. (2011b) observe such a difference in elevation of 
probability weighting functions between DFD and DFE, consistent with this point of view. 
5 Calibration and estimation 
We assert that the study of the putative experience-description gap can be enriched by 
applying advanced econometric estimation of decision parameters, first individual, then for 
(heterogeneous) groups (See Ben-Akiva et. 2012, and Wilcox 2008). We assume observed 
preferences between J pairs of prospects xpy and x'qy' The vector δ denotes the subjective 
parameters determining (w,u,λ). We assume only gains, writing w = w+. The PT value of xpy, 
PTδ(xpy), ,depends on δ. Our general notation facilitates applications of the following 
techniques to decision models other than PT and can allow us to examine robustness of an 
experience-description gap.  
Deterministic models 
One way to estimate δ is by minimizing some distance function. If we can, say, derive 
certainty equivalents from our data, then we can take δ such that the certainty equivalents 
predicted by δ are as close as possible to the observations. Another way is to minimize the 
number of observed choices in J that δ mispredicts. This will usually give a region of optimal 
δs.  
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Stochastic models 
Thus far we have assumed a deterministic model of choice and specified no error 
theory. We next consider a number of probabilistic choice models. After describing an error 
process, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation can be used to estimate δ.  
Trembling or misreporting  
Decision makers can get confused and choose randomly, say with probability π. In this 
case the probability of a “wrong” choice becomes π/2. It can be shown that the likelihood is 
then maximized by maximizing the number of correctly predicted choices, agreeing with the 
aforementioned second deterministic way. The ML estimate of π is twice the proportion of 
incorrect prediction choices.  
Continuous error 
An alternative error process entails that a random and independent, continuously 
distributed noise term ε is added to each PT value, or that each PT value is multiplied by a 
random positive factor. It can be seen that we obtain the well-known logit model when ε has 
an extreme value distribution. In the additive case, the decision maker now chooses xpy over 
x'qy' with probability 
exp[]
exp[] + exp[

′′]
, 
where σ > 0 denotes the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution. The bigger σ is, the 
closer we are to random, fifty-fifty, choice. For σ tending to 0, we approximate deterministic 
choice. ML can again be used to estimate σ and δ.  
Random parameters 
Some error models assume that in each choice situation a new PT model is chosen 
according to some probability distribution over δ. For example, the power of the utility 
function may be determined randomly for each choice. Whereas the above models allow for 
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implausibly frequent violations of stochastic dominance (when the PT value is close between 
two options, but one stochastically dominates another prospect), these models allow for no 
such violation. The resulting likelihood functions are more complex and require simulation 
methods (Train 2009) especially when several individual parameters have to be measured 
simultaneously (e.g. the power of the utility function, the kink of utility between gains and 
losses, and the parameter of the probability weighting function, as in de Palma and Picard, 
2010). 
Error theories for decision from experience 
In DFE, probabilities of outcomes are not described to subjects, but subjects have to 
learn them from sampling. To formulate this learning one could define the decision maker’s 
knowledge about the unknown probabilities p and q as the (prior) probability distribution 
f(p,q). One can then apply PT using f(p,q) and invoke the above error theories, combined with 
theories of learning and updating. This may lead to new explanations of the discrepancies 
between DFE and DFD, such as regarding the weighting for rare events (black swans). 
Group models and heterogeneity 
While the above models focus on parameters at the individual level, the techniques can 
also be used to estimate population or group level parameters. Heterogeneity of δ can either 
systematically vary across the population in the logit equation above (by interacting the 
parameters with individual characteristics) or randomly vary as in the random parameter 
model. The random parameter distribution is assumed to be a distribution across a population 
rather than across decision instances of a single individual. The random distribution can be 
either continuous or discrete. The discrete case (a latent class choice model) allows one to 
estimate segments of the population that have distinctly different decision behaviors. The 
resulting model describes both who is likely to be in the segment as well as the segment-
specific behavior (Walker and Ben-Akiva 2011). This could be useful in capturing different 
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probability weighting functions and loss aversion characteristics as influenced by the 
experimental design. 
In one early attempt at econometric estimation, Fox et al. (2013) compared choices in a 
DFE sampling paradigm to choices in decision under risk by the same participants over a 
number of studies.  They relied on the most successful parameterization of PT from a horse 
race run by Stott (2006), which included a logit error model. A common utility function 
parameter and error parameter were assumed to apply to DFE and DFD, but the (single) 
weighting function parameter was allowed to vary across methods.  Estimation was 
accomplished using simple MLE. Results of this investigation found that data accord well 
with a stochastic PT model in which decisions from description are characterized by an 
inverse-S shaped weighting function and decisions from experience are characterized by 
decision weights that almost exactly linear (i.e., w(p) = p).   
6 Conclusions 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from our interdisciplinary examination of the 
putative experience-description gap in decision under uncertainty.  
First, while the major source of under-responsiveness to rare and “Black Swan” events 
may be sampling error (which can cause sheer unawareness that rare events could occur) and 
misplaced faith in Gaussian distributions (which can give rise to misplaced confidence that 
rare events will not occur), a robust experience-description gap remains when these factors 
are not at play.  
Second, the residual experience-description gap is not only about experience per se but 
also about the way in which information concerning the probability distribution over possible 
outcomes is learned by a decision maker. Thus, methods that draw decision makers’ attention 
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to possible outcomes in proportion to their probabilities of occurrence (in any sort of 
analogical fashion) may cause decision makers to weight them more linearly.  
Third, if one accounts for the fact that DFE paradigms entail ambiguity then one ought to 
compare DFE to DFD under ambiguity (rather than risk), where decision makers generally 
tend toward more “pessimistic” decision weights; the presence of ambiguity may therefore 
account for some of the putative experience-description gap.  
Finally, much future empirical and econometric work is required to fully flesh out these 
tentative conclusions, but we are encouraged to see that an initially polemical literature has 
spawned so much constructive new empirical work that is drawing researchers toward greater 
rapprochement.  
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